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RUNNING SILENT AND ALGORITHMIC
The U.S. Navy Strategic Vision in 2019

A

s of January 2019, the U.S. Navy does not possess a coherent, public, strategic
vision.1 The official statement of strategy, or the Navy’s strategic concept, to
use a term inspired by the late Samuel P. Huntington’s term, remains A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready of March 2015,
whose acronym is CS21R (R for revised).2 The Department of the Navy (DON)
leadership has never declared CS21R to be superseded, nor has anything been
published to supplant it.3 However, CS21R was written to support (and possibly
shape) the foreign policy proclivities of the administration of President Barack
H. Obama; its predecessor document, CS21 of October 2007, was released during the administration of President George W. Bush. Both of these presidents
endorsed engagement with the international community (albeit in contrasting
forms).4 The public statements of President Donald J. Trump appear to indicate
that some of the principles articulated in CS21R may no longer be a good fit,
and indeed the emergence of an international system dominated by great-power
competition is now more apparent. Outsiders who study the policies of the U.S.
Navy are well aware of this disconnect.5
Yet the U.S. Navy does, in fact, have a strategic vision that reflects the tenets of
former Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis’s National Defense Strategy (NDS).
Within the Chief of Naval Operations staff (OPNAV), this strategic document
has been referred to as “the Navy’s response to the NDS” or “the Navy’s contribution to the joint force.” Like the NDS, it is classified “Secret” and not available
publicly. Unlike the NDS, however, the Navy document does not have an unclassified summary, and there is little indication that one eventually will be prepared.
If the Navy’s strategic vision is not available publicly, how can we make sense
of the service’s future policies, resource requirements, dispositions and deployments, and budget submissions? Likewise, how can the U.S. Navy convince the
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American people—and obviously the political decision makers—of the validity
and logic of its course? How do we know what the naval leadership intends?
In the spirit of the descriptions (and hype) of current discussions of artificial
intelligence (AI), we can apply human intelligence by analyzing the sum of what
can be described metaphorically as a complex algorithm. In other words, we
can combine the current white papers and program guidance(s) of the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) and Secretary of the Navy, along with related official
and semiofficial sources, to generate an approximate outline of the U.S. Navy’s
strategic focus.6
STRATEGIC VISION BY ALGORITHM
Included in this algorithm are (1) the 2018 National Defense Strategy and its
publicly released Summary; (2) CS21R, which lays out what remains the official
(DON) strategy but appears overtaken by events and out of sync with presidential
guidance; (3) three white papers that provide general direction from the current
CNO, Admiral John M. Richardson, USN; (4) remnants of the officially superseded Air-Sea Battle, a victim of joint ideology; (5) the report to Congress from
an officially unofficial Navy future fleet architecture study team; (6) a numerical
goal—355 ships—that appears largely in the rhetoric of senior officials; and (7) a
book-length monograph attempting to define the current Navy in terms of naval
war fighting that was commissioned by a previous CNO but released only weeks
before his retirement (and thus is of questionable authority). Unlike the seven
samurai (or seven gunfighters) of legend and film, these seven share a similar
cause but do not necessarily fight well together.
In addition to these seven items there are statutory reports to Congress, such
as the thirty-year shipbuilding plan and the Secretary of the Navy’s annual report,
from which can be gleaned particular details or other clues about the Navy’s navigational track.7 Additionally, as previously noted, classified top-level guidance or
guidances from the Secretary of Defense exist—including the 2018 NDS—that
cannot be ignored and, under Secretary Mattis, shaped (and changed) the Navy’s
approach to building its vision.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy also has its classified guidance prioritizing its
resource requirements for its program objective memorandum (POM) submission to the defense budget.8 This strategic planning guidance, long-range
planning guidance, Navy strategic plan for program objective memorandum, or
simply guidance (the name changes with CNOs) is used by Navy program analysts and resource sponsors in lieu of translating a loftier strategic vision from
strategy-speak to programese.9 The current Chief of Naval Operations guidance
(CNOG) for the fiscal year 2020 program objective memorandum actually was
written ahead of the then-under-draft “response to the NDS.” So, in fact, the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/20
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SEVEN PRIMARY SOURCES FOR DETERMINING NAVY’S STRATEGIC VISION
Document Type

Source

1

Secretary of
Defense guidance

Summary of the 2018 National Defense
Strategy (Summary NDS)

2018

Dominant joint/DoD guidance

2

Preexisting
strategic vision

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged,
Ready (CS21R)

March 2015

Current Navy official vision

3

Fleet design
guidance from
current CNO
Richardson

a. Design for Maintaining Maritime
Superiority, 1.0 (Design 1.0)

January 2016

Updated by 2.0

b. The Future Navy

May 2017

In effect

c. Design for Maintaining Maritime
Superiority, 2.0 (Design 2.0)

December
2018

Affirms majority of 1.0; adds
specific guidance

Air-Sea Battle
remnants

a. Admiral Greenert, USN, and
General Mark Welsh, USAF, Breaking
the Kill Chain

2013

b. Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea
Battle: Multi-service Collaboration
to Address Anti-access and Area Denial

May 2013

c. Hutchins et al., “Joint Concept for
Access and Maneuver in the Global
Commons,” Joint Force Quarterly, no.
84 (1st Quarter 2017)

2017

Publicly subsumed by Joint
Access and Maneuver in the
Global Commons (JAM-GC)
joint concept paper (however,
JAM-GC is applicable only
tangentially to antiaccess
challenges)

4

Release Date

Status

5

Navy Project
Team report to
Congress (N8
representative
lead)

Report to Congress: Alternative Future
Fleet Platform Architecture Study

October/
November
2016

Overtaken by events and 355
number?

6

Directive for 355ship Navy

Executive Summary, 2016 Navy
Force Structure Assessment (FSA), 14
December 2016

December
14, 2016

2018–19 FSA is under way

7

Former CNO
Greenert’s
handbook on
Navy enduring
attributes

How We Fight: Handbook for the
Naval Warfighter

July 2015

Unclear and unpublicized

programming transliteration actually appeared (within the OPNAV staff) prior
to the written strategy narrative.10
In a well-planned deployment, all these sources would synchronize to create
a whole greater than the sum of their parts. Alas, conflicting perceptions of the
post–post–Cold War world and rival political and bureaucratic ambitions have
created crosscurrents that subtract as well as add. For example, some of these
documents were written under the assumption of increased defense resources,
whereas the midterm election of November 6, 2018, led to new House Armed
Services Committee leadership that has been warning of leaner defense budgets.11
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The intent of this article is to sum the algorithm and provide an outline of the U.S.
Navy’s current service strategic vision.
DOES IT REALLY MATTER?
Before describing each of the seven algorithmic inputs, we first need to deal
with the question whether having a public USN strategic vision really matters.
To the naval analyst operating in fleet commands, or even in the trenches of the
Pentagon, and other navalists in general, the probable answer is “not really.” As
Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, USN (CNO, 1986–90), stated, “Over the years our
Maritime Strategy has been very much like the British Constitution—unwritten
but thoroughly understood by those who practice it.”12 Indeed, for those who
serve in the fleet, the objectives of deterring war, maintaining U.S. access to
the materials and markets of international trade, intervening in crises when so
ordered, fighting terrorist groups, and providing a sovereign, forward presence
are quite evident. For those who work on future Navy programs and budget, the
CNOG and other classified documents are more directly useful.13
Ultimately, however, it is not the Navy or even the Secretary of Defense that
actually determines Navy programs and budget, but rather the members of
Congress as representatives of the American people. The fact that congressmen
who normally are supportive of the naval services recently have expressed their
desire that the Navy articulate a clear vision should be of concern to the service.14
Yet, taking its cue from Secretary of Defense Mattis, who showed a penchant to
discourage “too much” openness to media, the Navy has continued to run (relatively) silent.15
There are at least three likely explanations for the secretary’s caution with the
media. First is the official reason: too much information should not be transmitted to potential enemies. But in the case of the U.S. Navy, whose strategic
predilections were made clear through media speculation (and some public
discussion) of the air-sea battle concept (circa 2009–15), that reason seems a
bit implausible. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and others know toward
whom the Navy’s operational planning is directed.16 Second might be his desire
that the services tightly conform to the jointly focused NDS. Since the Navy is
known for its independently derived strategic visions—primarily on the basis of
applying its own traditional operating concerns against changing conditions and
emerging threats—this seems a more plausible concern. Third, more speculatively, is that the Secretary of Defense wants to ensure that the Navy—along with
the other services and the rest of the Department of Defense (DoD)—does not
get crosswise with future tweets and other sudden proposals emanating from the
White House.17 The president announced his desire for a 350-ship Navy at approximately the same time as he announced his proposals for a reduced federal
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/20
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budget.18 Quiet might be prudent at this particular moment. However, silence
over its service visions never has seemed to help the Navy’s long-term viability in
the past, particularly in terms of budget and force structure.
THE CASE OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY
The public release of the Cold War–era Maritime Strategy in 1986 is one example
of how public discussion—particularly by influential academics, with all the disputation and opposition that implies—actually improved the vision, raised public
awareness of the Navy’s mission, and generated considerable congressional interest.19 With strong presidential interest and support for the strategy (which justified the political goal of a six-hundred-ship Navy), the public discussion served
the Navy’s institutional interests.20 Primarily through media reports of reactions
and resulting controversies, American citizens who might never have given their
Navy a thought became aware that the Navy was doing something important.21
Additionally, a case can be made that public release of the Maritime Strategy
actually heightened Cold War conventional deterrence, since the cacophony of
debate reinforced a belief in the minds of Kremlin decision makers that the U.S.
Navy / Marine Corps actually would employ its major forces in carrying out
audacious and high-risk attacks on the Soviet periphery in the High North and
Pacific in the event of a war in central Europe.22 If the U.S. Navy was willing to sail
its carrier battle groups (in conjunction with its attack submarines [SSNs]) in the
face of long-range Soviet bombers and attack aviation in an attempt to penetrate
ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) bastions and destroy the Soviet fleet within
home waters, what else might it attempt?23
Interestingly, there are continuing indications that, similarly, analysts working
for the CCP today frequently are concerned that they might miss critical policy
nuances revealed in cacophonous American public debates, even while many
American decision makers treat that cacophony as background noise.24
VISION AMID AUSTERITY
There is yet another purpose for creating and updating a clear strategic
vision—but one that naval decision makers hesitate to contemplate, lest their
fears become reality. A clear strategic vision helps to maintain the motivation and
morale of naval personnel and public support for the naval services during times
of fiscal austerity. Samuel Huntington identified this factor in his argument for
a naval strategic concept in the 1950s. Huntington noted that “if a service does
not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and political leaders will
be confused as to the role of the service . . . and apathetic or hostile to the claims
made by the service on the resources of society.”25 At that time, both a shrinking (or, rather, already shrunk) budget and the arguments of the U.S. Air Force
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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threatened to strip the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps of their wartime missions.
Initially, the DON seemed unable to articulate its purpose in the nuclear age.
After all, having defeated imperial Japan in the greatest joint campaign in military history, the service’s relevance seemed evident—at least to the Navy itself.
However, by accepting the need to develop and promulgate a strategic concept
understandable to the public as well as political decision makers, Navy and Marine Corps leaders were able to reestablish an internal sense of purpose as well as
regain public and congressional support. Having a vision that was both internal
and public was a particular priority under the extended tour of duty of Admiral
Arleigh A. Burke (CNO, 1955–61). As an internal guide, an unclassified Naval
Warfare Publication (NWP) 1, Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, was created as
the foundation for all other naval publications. It was updated routinely until its
quiet demise in the 1990s.26
The post-Vietnam Navy (circa 1974–81) was racked by personnel problems,
arguably because of both reduced funding for readiness and a lack of a motivating sense of purpose. The creation of the Maritime Strategy was instrumental in
regaining this sense of purpose.
There are strong indications that the promise of a 350- or 355-ship Navy by
the Trump administration—whatever its degree of commitment—may give way
to a reduction in the overall defense budget under new Democratic leadership
in the House of Representatives. There had been previous stirrings among fiscal
hawks in both parties, and Secretary of Defense Mattis never committed himself
to the 355 number.27 Thus, the Navy’s anticipated increase actually may turn into
a winter of decreased resources.28 Such winters are times when strong and clear
vision seems to be needed most.
In sum, a clear, publicly articulated Navy strategic vision has mattered—for
congressional and public support, as well as for internal morale and sense of
purpose. Its absence does have effects.
NDS AND THE NAVY
If NDS is the driver of the current Navy self-vision, what is in the document that
directly affects the Navy?
Working from the unclassified Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy
of the United States of America (hereafter Summary NDS), one first observes that
its strategic change toward a “balance of power” approach to deterrence should
mean a tilt toward the Navy’s traditional missions. The Summary NDS states
unequivocally, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”29 Although the U.S. Marine Corps, Naval
Special Warfare (SEAL), and explosive ordnance disposal units and naval tactical
aviation were involved deeply in countering jihadists—who also occasionally
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/20
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were targeted by Tomahawk-firing ships and submarines—most of the bluewater Navy had but tangential roles in countering terrorism, even if one counts
the Navy individual augmentees in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.30 The Navy’s primary purposes—of ensuring access to the markets and materials that constitute international trade and deterring, fighting, or facilitating power projection
in interstate war—were not part of what former Defense Secretaries called “the
wars we are in.” If interstate conflict is now “where it’s at,” with the primary list of
likely opponents being represented by the 2+2 construct of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) and Russia, followed by Iran and North Korea, then the Navy has
to be a primary fighting component, given that all the above are separated from
the United States by oceans.31
However, as one reads through the Summary NDS, a subtle ground force–
centric approach to strategy can be detected. For example, the global operating model for joint force posture is described by the four terms contact, blunt,
surge, and homeland (CBSH).32 The first three are general descriptions of phases
of a land campaign that do not have exact naval equivalents. Would forwarddeployed naval forces constitute a contact layer, or are they a standing blunt
force? Both terms imply a classic ground engagement among armies, whereas
modern naval combat is described most persuasively as “a struggle for the first
salvo” (even if that is a Cold War Soviet concept) or an attempt to “attack effectively first” (in the words of Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN [Ret.]).33 The U.S.
Navy never actually has surged in a war against a powerful naval opponent. In
the World War II Pacific War, most high-value units were already at sea or within
range of the enemy; instead, the surge occurred in industrial production and
mobilization—a feat that many doubt could be replicated today. Likewise, the
maritime defense of the homeland is largely the responsibility of the U.S. Coast
Guard, although SSBNs remain the most survivable leg of strategic nuclear deterrence, and naval theater ballistic-missile defense, along with Aegis Ashore, could
be integrated into national missile defense (a mission the Navy has avoided).
It simply is tough to fit naval war fighting into the CBSH formula—a fact that
may have deeper implications. One can shoehorn naval force structure into the
formula for comparative modeling with land forces, but only by “fuzzing” their
designed operational employment.
Following a fairly traditional description of objectives, strategic objectives,
and desired capabilities—none that would be completely out of place in a Cold
War document—the Summary NDS sets goals of “building a more lethal force”
and “modernizing key capabilities” in such areas as “forward force maneuver
and posture resilience”—presumably a Navy forte. Although the Summary NDS
calls for prioritizing investment in forces that “can deploy, survive, operate, maneuver, and regenerate in all domains while under attack,” the sole detail offered
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 135

7

2/25/19 10:40 AM

136

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 20

for this force investment is the effort to transition from “large, centralized, unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive basing.”34 Since
the Navy has advertised itself long and loudly as the strategic alternative to large,
centralized, unhardened (land) infrastructure, one might assume that unique
naval capabilities might be mentioned briefly at that point in the Summary NDS
document—but they are not.
What does the absence of the quite standard praise of naval forces (even in
joint documents) as maneuverable and dispersed sovereign territory not fettered
to land infrastructure and capable of crisis response (blunting, perhaps?) mean?
One merely can speculate, but perhaps the Secretary of Defense really did not
believe that the fleet is actually as effective or survivable in an antiaccess scenario
(or the current preferred term of contested environment) as the Navy perceives
itself to be. In any event, the Summary NDS does not contain a lot of hooks on
which the Navy can hang its narrative hat—unless it wants to challenge joint
ideology. A search of the Summary NDS failed to detect a single use of the word
ocean.35
The Summary NDS does devote a full two pages (out of eleven total) to DoD’s
desire to “strengthen alliances and attract new partners.”36 It focuses on three
elements: “uphold a foundation of mutual respect, expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning . . . and deepen interoperability.”
Regional alliance and partnership networks are delineated (Indo-Pacific, NATO,
Middle East, Western Hemisphere, and Africa). In this, the Summary NDS could
fit easily into an Obama or Bush (either forty-one or forty-three) administration
document. It also, amazingly, could fit within CS21R—except for a few telling
details in the “uphold” element that tie back to Trump administration themes,
including accountability.
The first of those details alluding to the Trump administration’s particular
viewpoint is the recognition that “alliances and coalitions are built on free will and
shared responsibility” (emphasis added). Then, in a possible jab at previous administrations (whether stocked with neoconservatives or liberal internationalists)—
and, in truth, a practical and significant change—the summary proclaims: “While
we will unapologetically represent America’s values and belief in democracy, we
will not seek to impose our way of life by force.”37 But even as strongly, it states
that “we expect allies and partners to contribute an equitable share to our mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing
their defense capabilities.” Those are not firm requirements found in CS21R. It is
hard not to perceive that “accountability” is the main message of the NDS cooperation section and that the remaining standard alliance/partnership recitation in
no way implies that America is absolutely dependent on its alliance structure or
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that it expects any limits on its free will. In short, CS21R is built around alliances,
partnerships, and (obviously) cooperation; the NDS is not.
Inclining one toward the cynical view that the two pages extolling cooperation
are simply standard fare is the fact that they are followed by a concluding section
titled “Reforming the Department for Greater Performance and Affordability.”
That goal has remained beyond the power of mere humans (including Defense
Secretaries) nearly forever.
THE STATUS OF CS21R
As previously noted, officially the Navy’s strategic vision remains A Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready of March 2015,
much better known by its acronym, CS21R. CS21R is a revision of the original
CS21, signed by the three chiefs of the sea services (Marine Corps, Navy, Coast
Guard) in 2007. No successor has replaced it; no naval leader has publicly repudiated it.
Although the original CS21 was released under Admiral Gary Roughead
(CNO, 2007–11), it was largely a confirmation of the concept of Admiral Michael
G. Mullen (CNO, 2005–2007; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007–11) of
a one-thousand-ship Navy (without using that term), consisting of the U.S. fleet
and those of its allies and partners who would cooperate to ensure security at sea
in accordance with international law and guided by the provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).38 Thus, the changes in the
world environment between 2007 and 2015 (primarily the expansion of a potentially hostile People’s Liberation Army [PLA], along with the definite hostility of
Russian president Vladimir Putin) necessitated a revision that—while maintaining an emphasis on global partnerships—expands its discussion of U.S. naval
missions or functions and a fleet design that describes the capabilities needed to
carry out these functions. One could invite the PLA Navy (PLAN) to participate
in the U.S. Navy’s annual RIMPAC exercise, but that would not mean the Chinese
would honor any international tribunal ruling on law of the sea violations. Yet the
flashing light of the one-thousand-ship Navy still shines through both texts; it is
dimmer in the second (CS21R) only because the additional section was added to
discuss naval missions and general force-design goals, making the revised document twice as long as the original.
Consider the contrast. The Summary NDS devotes two of eleven pages to alliances, partnerships, and international cooperation (18 percent of the document);
CS21R devotes almost twenty of thirty-seven pages to alliances, partnerships,
and international cooperation (54 percent). This provides the initial clue that
the CS21R does not quite fit the Trump administration’s focus on deterring (or, if
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necessary, winning) great-power conflict with China or Russia. CS21R’s stress on
cooperation always betrayed an optimistic view of the future roles of China and
Russia in supporting the current international system (instead of undermining
it) and often referred to their roles as “responsible stakeholders.” In contrast, the
National Security Strategy of the United States of America of December 2017—
parent of the NDS—envisions a world of great-power competition in which
cooperation cannot be assumed. Quite simply, CS21R is out of sync with current
higher directives.
So, what can be salvaged? The second half of CS21R, beginning with “Seapower in Support of National Security,” contains the traditional description of naval
missions, including deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security.39 But it also adds a fifth mission that had not appeared previously in other
higher-level documents: “all domain access,” a focus on defeating the antiaccess
“reconnaissance strike networks” of potential opponents.40
To achieve all-domain access requires the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and
U.S. Coast Guard (to whatever extent it can) to commit to investments in battlespace awareness (persistent surveillance), assured command and control (resilient networks that can fight jamming), cyberspace operations, electromagneticmaneuver warfare (EMW) (i.e., electronic warfare spread across domains), and
integrated fires. This is certainly an appropriate list of capabilities necessary for
countering antiaccess strategies. Additionally, it is similar to such lists contained
in all subsequent USN public documents. If one added unmanned systems, machine learning, and AI as means of achieving the above capabilities, one would
have a depiction of the Navy’s current desired investments. These desired capabilities permeate discussions of the Navy’s future fleet designs.
THE CNO, THE DESIGN FOR MAINTAINING MARITIME SUPERIORITY,
AND THE FUTURE NAVY
The current CNO, Admiral Richardson, has released a series of three white papers that describe a design for maritime superiority and the characteristics of the
future navy. Although they would seem disconnected from some of the premises
of CS21R, the first document, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,
Version 1.0 (hereafter Design 1.0), describes itself as a step “along a future course
to achieve the aims articulated in [CS21R] in this new environment.”41 (Notably,
the subsequent Design 2.0 does not mention CS21R.)
Design 1.0
Design 1.0 is a total of eight pages that are intended to “guide our behaviors and
investments, both this year and in the years to come.”42 However, it also states
that “[m]ore specific details about programs and funding adjustments will be
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reflected in our annual budget documents,” undoubtedly referring to, among
others, the CNOG.
Design 1.0 begins by describing the U.S. Navy’s mission in the joint-approved,
domain-specific fashion: as conducting “prompt and sustained combat incident
to operations at sea.” But it subtly broadens this to include “protect[ing] America
from attack and preserv[ing] America’s strategic influence in key regions of the
world,” presumably through persistent naval presence. It follows with a description of the “strategic environment,” which links Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s articulation of the need for a navy that could guarantee access to international trade and overseas markets and materials to the technological changes
driving prosperity. Later in the document, the CNO acknowledges the fundamental truths of the nature of war: “a violent human contest between thinking
and adapting adversaries for political gain.” He cites the thinkers whose wisdom
has shaped the Naval War College course curriculum: Mahan (obviously), Thu
cydides, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao (strangely), and Corbett.43
Design 1.0 describes the strategic environment in terms of three trends, all
of which have been articulated in previous Navy documents: increased international trade across seas, and potentially through the Arctic; a continually growing
global information network; and increased rates of technological creation and
adoption, including robotics, energy storage, three-dimensional printing, lowcost sensors, genetic sciences, and AI.
Adapting is the key point, and the CNO sees a peacetime competition in strategic technology among global powers: the United States, China, and Russia. This
is a view that CNO Richardson has espoused frequently since the beginning of
his tenure, before the election of President Trump, and in sync with proponents
of the Third Offset Strategy such as former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of the Navy Robert O. Work (albeit not in the same words). Unlike
CS21R, Design 1.0 very clearly refers to China and Russia, pointing out that the
“Russian Navy is operating with a frequency and in areas not seen for almost two
decades, and the Chinese PLA(N) is extending its reach around the world.” (The
+2 of North Korea and Iran also are mentioned, but very briefly.) Here is where
technological advancement links with the Navy’s desired capabilities, as identified in the second half of CS21R; they are elements of the strategic competition
with two regional powers that have antiaccess networks.
CNO Richardson does not use his predecessor’s assured access term, and he
has made his dislike of antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) terminology evident.44
Yet it would seem that the Navy’s goal is to adapt emerging technologies so as to
retain (or regain) the ability to penetrate opponents’ A2/AD networks. A2/AD
remains a regularly used term throughout DoD.
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Design 1.0 also lists the CNO’s view of Navy “core attributes of our profession”
as consisting of “integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness.” These are
distinct from the also-cited Navy core values of honor, courage, and commitment. In the CNO’s guidance, “[i]f we abide by these attributes, our values should
be clearly evident in our actions.”45 Although his predecessor expressed these
attributes somewhat differently, the desire to define naval attributes provides a
link to the quietly released How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval Warfighter,
document number seven in our algorithm, of Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert,
USN (CNO, 2011–15).
The heart (and conclusion) of Design 1.0, however, is found in three pages
describing the CNO’s “four lines of effort,” which are his objectives that are intended to guide current Navy decision-making. Since each of the four lines of
effort is individually color coded, it has become common for Navy staff officers
to explain their projects or tasks in the form of “it supports purple (or blue, green,
or yellow).”
The first of the four lines (blue) is to “strengthen naval power at and from
sea,” an obvious and continuing goal.46 Within this goal resides a prioritization
of programs to align “our organization to best support generating operational
excellence.” First is to “[m]aintain and modernize the undersea leg of the strategic
deterrent triad,” described as “foundational to our survival as a nation.” Indeed,
CNO Richardson consistently has identified the forthcoming Columbia-class
SSBN as his priority acquisition program.47
The second program priority in the blue line is to develop and test new
concepts through fleet exercises for war fighting in “highly ‘informationalized’
and contested environment[s]” in “partnership with the Marine Corps.” Since
contested environment is a euphemism for A2/AD, one can speculate that this is
intended to patch over some of the fraying between the two naval services that
occurred during the development of the air-sea battle concept. The third priority
calls for expansion of the EMW capabilities identified in CS21R.
This is followed by a related fourth priority: to “explore alternative fleet
designs, including kinetic and non-kinetic payloads and both manned and
unmanned systems” capable of operating in the “highly ‘informationalized’ environment.” Indeed, as we shall see, this is a task to which OPNAV is devoting a
considerable amount of effort.
The two final tasks of the blue line are organizational examinations of U.S.
Fleet Forces Command (FFC); Commander, Pacific Fleet; and OPNAV itself. In
reality, the comprehensiveness of this task has been impacted by the more immediate studies of the western Pacific warship collisions. However, a Second Fleet
command has been created out of operational elements of FFC.
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The second line of effort (green) is to “achieve high velocity learning at every
level.”48 Tasks in this line include the incorporation of best practices, expanding
the use of “learning-centered technologies, simulators, online gaming, analytics
and other tools,” and “[o]ptimiz[ing] the Navy intellectual enterprise.” Of personal concern to the CNO is his desire to make Navy wargaming—a learning tool
for which the service is justifiably famous—more iterative, possibly via the use of
AI or AI-assisted systems.
The third line of effort (yellow), to “strengthen our Navy team for the future,”
focuses on improvements in personnel management and leadership, including
information-technology learning in a Sailor 2025 program.49 It does not discuss
radical changes to personnel accessions, however. Most of the language of yellow
has been used before.
The fourth line of effort (purple) is to “expand and strengthen our network of
partners.”50 But international partnerships (à la CS21R) are but a small piece of
this effort, while partnerships with other services and agencies (including future
planning and assessments), private research and development labs, and commercial industry are emphasized.
Design 1.0 concludes with an exhortation for all to adopt a sense of urgency:
“We will remain the world’s finest Navy only if we all fight each and every minute
to get better. Our competitors are focused on taking the lead—we must pick up
the pace and deny them. The margins of victory are razor thin—but decisive!”51
No one could deny that the CNO sees the U.S. Navy locked in a strategic and
technological competition with very capable opponents.
The Future Navy
However, by 2017, CNO Richardson, possibly concerned that his Navy continued
to lack his sense of urgency, issued a supplemental white paper, The Future Navy.
There have been some contending interpretations of the impact and importance
of The Future Navy.52 In its defense, it is not designed to impart new direction or
tasking beyond that already laid out in Design 1.0. Rather, as noted, it is intended
to ratchet up the intensity of the Navy’s analytical efforts for determining how to
integrate unmanned systems and other technological developments.
In part, The Future Navy white paper likely was a reaction to several future
force architecture studies that were performed at the direction of Congress as
part of defense legislation for fiscal year 2016 (FY16). Congress (led by the late
Senator John S. McCain) required three alternative studies of future Navy force
structure (for the 2020–35 period) to use in checking the Navy’s thirty-year
shipbuilding plan. The first was by an independent study group made up of Navy
staff members from OPNAV N8, Fleet Forces Command, and the Naval War College, and other naval analytical organization representatives. This report was not
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staffed by the normal OPNAV process and was not endorsed by a cognizant flag
officer but simply was forwarded to Congress by the CNO along with the other
two alternative studies (via the Secretary of the Navy) without endorsement. This
is the officially unofficial unclassified Navy Project Team report (source number
five in table 1) that will be described later.53
At a total of nine pages, The Future Navy begins with its conclusions up front
concerning the FY16 studies: (1) “the nation needs a more powerful Navy, on the
order of 350 ships, [but] that includes a combination of manned and unmanned
systems”; (2) “more platforms are necessary but not sufficient. The Navy must
also incorporate new technologies and new operational concepts.” This is followed by a section header intended to get across the sense of urgency: “Faster and
More Complex. And Faster.”54
The Future Navy does add statements of the value of naval forward presence
back into the dialogue, pointing out that the “presence of capable platforms
enables naval forces’ inherent responsiveness” and that “U.S. ships are sovereign
American territory” and “are self-sufficient when they respond.” However, this is
couched as enabling the U.S. Navy (and Marine Corps) to be “full partners with
the Army and Air Force as conflicts unfold,” being “often first on the scene, and
continu[ing] to preserve U.S. interests in the long term, after the conflict subsides, through continued and routine operations forward.”55
The Future Navy also attempts to clarify that, regardless of whether the optimum fleet size is 355 ships, numbers of ships do matter, because “[t]he number
of ships in the Navy’s fleet determines where we can be, and being there is a key
to naval power.”56 In other words, a modern, highly capable warship may have the
firepower of two less capable vessels, but—unlike the pair—that one ship cannot
be in two oceans at the same time. Quantity does have a quality that quality alone
cannot replicate.
The remaining text of The Future Navy concentrates on the need for greater
force connectivity (even while dispersed), technological advances such as those
identified in Design 1.0, and unmanned and autonomous systems as both extensions of existing platforms and sources of new capabilities.
One observation that does appear in The Future Navy and not in the other
sources discussed here is CNO Richardson’s conviction that the defense industrial bases can increase their speed of production to build a larger fleet faster than
some analysts suggest. “Multiple shipbuilding and aircraft production lines are
‘hot’—currently producing”—but “[t]hey can do more. . . . Buying aircraft carriers at the economically-optimal rate—three or four years apart instead of the
current five or more years—will not only get us a more powerful fleet faster, but
also will save considerable money. . . . [Likewise,] an analysis of the industrial
base shows we could build up to seven additional destroyers in the near term,
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and up to 14 more small surface combatants.”57 Similar industrial base statistics
are cited for other ship types, adding to a total of “29 more ships and almost 300
more aircraft over the next seven years than our current plan.” Therefore, if there
is the will, the sense of urgency can be answered with action.
Design 2.0
In December 2018, the CNO released A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0. Advance CNO briefings about the document indicated that
it would note both areas in which progress had been made and where more or
different types of progress would be needed. It does both, and, more importantly,
it attempts to balance an ever-increasing sense of urgency against the need for
“sustainability”—the avoidance of “overextension in the short- and long-term.”
Overextension is defined as “the pursuit of ends that are beyond the ways and
means of the force.”58 Although the remarks on overextension appear in a section
entitled “Our Response” (to the challenges of competition with China and Russia), it is buttressed by an earlier statement on the security environment: “We cannot become overwhelmed by the blistering pace. This is a long-term competition.
We must think in terms of infinite, instead of finite, time frames. Only sustainable
approaches will prevail.”59
Design 2.0 continues the four color lines of effort; however, “yellow” has been
changed to “gold.” Their overall substance remains the same, but they are packed
with much more detail, which is why Design 2.0 is twenty pages, whereas Design
1.0 was eight. The green line of effort is modified significantly from “achieve high
velocity learning at every level” to “achieve high velocity outcomes,” which allows
for inclusion of very specific acquisition goals that did not appear in the previous
version. These acquisition goals include the following: “Award the Future Frigate
contract by 2020 to deliver as soon as possible (ASAP). . . . Develop and field an
offensive hypersonic weapon by 2025,” and other equally specific items.60 There
is a bit of irony, however, in having these goals as directives in a CNO-authored
document since—as the CNO himself admits—DoD reorganizations in the past
three decades have resulted in very limited CNO control over the acquisition process. The program executive officers of Navy acquisition programs largely report
to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition),
with the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense critiquing almost every
step along the way.
The green line also splits Navy analytical efforts into a “concept development
hub” centered on the East Coast (DEVGRUEAST) and a “capability development
hub” centered on the West Coast (DEVGRUWEST). Of the Navy’s advanced educational institutions, the Naval War College would be a core of the former and the
Naval Postgraduate School a core of the latter.
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Meanwhile, the revised blue line identifies continuing Navy support to recent
operational changes: the reestablishment of Commander, Second Fleet in the
Atlantic, and the implementation of the dynamic force employment concept
outlined in the NDS to make warship deployments more situational and less
predictable.61 The gold line adds the establishment of a three-star Director for
Warfighting Development (including education, experimentation, and analysis)
as N7 in OPNAV. The purple line’s discussion of partnerships specifically delineates supporting NATO and maturing Joint Forces Command–Norfolk “as the
NATO headquarters for high-end naval operations and warfare in the Atlantic
theater.”62
Additionally, the CNO attached two letters to Design 2.0 as addenda. The first,
a “Charge of Command” to commanding officers, clearly reiterates that “[t]he
responsibility of the Commanding Officer for his or her command is absolute,”
under all circumstances. The second, “One Navy Team,” emphasizes inclusion
and diversity within the Navy.
AIR-SEA BATTLE: FROM VISIBLE FOCUS TO UNDER THE RADAR
If broadened beyond its (presumably) exclusive focus on the PLA, the air-sea
battle concept that consumed so much of the Navy’s intellectual capital (along
with some of the U.S. Air Force’s) earlier in this decade could make a coherent
Navy strategic vision by itself. Similarities to the Maritime Strategy are evident.
The basic concept was to integrate Navy and Air Force capabilities to deal more
effectively with the toughest potential war-fighting challenge of the day: to defeat
the PRC’s antiaccess strategy and respond to PRC aggression by conducting operations within Chinese-claimed water and airspace, including targeting military
forces ashore. In short, it attempted to answer the A2/AD problem.
A detailed argument has been made that the Cold War–era Maritime Strategy was itself a counter-antiaccess strategy, with the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps attempting to penetrate the layers of Soviet long-range bombers, cruisemissile-firing submarines, and the Soviet naval fleet to breach the Soviet Union’s
periphery and take pressure away from NATO’s central land front in Europe.63
Ironically, the title Air-Sea Battle is a reference to the air/land battle doctrine
that the U.S. Army and Air Force fashioned jointly to blunt a Soviet offensive
on the central front. Similar to the Maritime Strategy, Air-Sea Battle acquired a
number of influential academic and policy opponents, whose resistance gave the
appearance of official doctrine to what, in reality, was a combination of think
tank publications and an Air-Sea Battle Office assigned the task of coordinating
USN and USAF programs appropriate to an antiaccess scenario in the East Asian
maritime and littoral regions.64

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/20

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 144

16

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Tangredi: Running Silent and Algorithmic: The U.S. Navy Strategic Vision in

TA N G R E D I

145

However, by 2015, the air-sea battle concept was devitalized and finally consumed by joint ideology. It was a very logical approach to containing potential
PRC expansion—so logical that it frightened the U.S. Army (which naturally
had focused its force structure on “winning the wars we are in”) into believing
it could lose its appropriate share of the defense budget. Obviously, no one was
contemplating a land war in East Asia. If counterterrorism would no longer
be the primary fight for U.S. armed forces, what would be the role of decisive
land forces? (At the same time, the Marine Corps—which would have a role in
a maritime campaign—became concerned that its permanent partner, the U.S.
Navy, might be spurning it for greater integration with the Air Force.) The result
of bureaucratic and political pressure was that the Navy–Air Force Air-Sea Battle
Office was converted into a joint staff with the inclusion of Army and Marine
Corps representatives and outside contractors, under the supervision of the Joint
Staff, to develop a concept for joint access and maneuver in the global commons
(JAM-GC).
JAM-GC is another document that is classified but whose drafters have discussed it in open-source literature.65 However, it is focused on a problem that is
different from the air-sea battle concept. Its primary focus—access of military
forces into and within the global commons of sea, airspace over the oceans, and
space, all of which are not contested seriously—is not the same challenge as the
penetration of PRC antiaccess networks, the hardware of which is located largely
within sovereign PRC territory.66
Thus, the Navy lost control of a concept and narrative that could define its
de facto strategic focus: deterring potential PRC aggression by holding at risk
China’s antiaccess networks and its protection of its military capabilities and
homeland territory, and doing likewise to the potential threats of Russia, North
Korea, and Iran. Such an effort would require capabilities to defeat the PLA’s
maritime and conventionally armed rocket forces and to suppress its land-based
air defenses, hence requiring close Navy / Air Force collaboration. Inclusion of
decisive ground forces simply would not seem to be a part of this mission—the
approximation of a Cold War Maritime Strategy without any central-front battle
on land. Such an independent strategic vision of the Navy’s primary war-fighting
purpose conflicts with the twenty-first-century version of joint ideology that
mandates participation (or at least veto power) of every service in every mission.
Given the reluctance of the Obama administration to identify the PRC as a primary security threat, slipping the premises and operational concepts of Air-Sea
Battle under the radar in favor of the joint examination of a much more theoretical threat could be justified. However, the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and the NDS provide the justification for its resurrection. There is
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much in the air-sea battle concept that could shape a naval strategic vision—and,
because of the Navy’s focus on the Indo-Pacific region, it already has.
PACIFIC FLEET DOMINANCE OVER NAVAL STRATEGY
Although there is no one public document at which to point, the dominance of
the U.S. Pacific Fleet in defining the Navy’s de facto strategic vision is evident and
deserves some comment.
The Obama administration’s pivot to the Pacific may have required an adjustment for other U.S. agencies, but the USN pivot occurred prior to the 2006 transformation of U.S. Atlantic Fleet into FFC. The Atlantic’s numbered war-fighting
command, U.S. Second Fleet, also was disestablished in 2006. This move could
be viewed as a delayed response to the collapse of the Soviet navy (and Soviet
Union). The change also was prompted by the conversion of the joint combatant
command (COCOM) U.S. Atlantic Command into U.S. Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM) in 1999, an obvious indication that American decision makers did not
envision a challenge from the Russian navy (or anyone else) in the Atlantic Ocean
region.67 FFC retained responsibility for training and readiness for Atlantic-based
U.S. naval forces but also took a lead position in “providing” naval forces for all
COCOMs. Additionally, FFC was assigned “command and control of subordinate
Navy forces and shore activities during the planning and execution of assigned
service functions in support of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).”68 This paralleled the tasking of JFCOM to support the Joint Staff. (Ironically, JFCOM was
disestablished in 2011 and its functions were transferred back to the Joint Staff.)
The result of the former Atlantic Fleet taking on staff responsibilities that
might otherwise be directed by OPNAV was that its focus on naval war planning
became diluted in comparison with U.S. Pacific Fleet, which, additionally, has a
present potential threat in an expansionist PRC. Because of this circumstance and
the force of personality of the commanders, Pacific Fleet increased its influence
on naval strategy as a whole, with the creation of Air-Sea Battle as but one result.
Through a series of articles and statements, and with heavy use of the Navy’s
wargaming and analytical assets, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT),
Admiral Scott H. Swift, USN (COMPACFLT, 2015–18), became a primary
spokesman not only in identifying the PLAN as the U.S. Navy’s primary “pacing”
threat but in elucidating the changes the U.S. Navy would make to meet it.69 It
became obvious that U.S. Pacific Fleet sought its direction directly from the CNO,
not through FFC, and, in turn, sought to influence the CNO’s vision.
With the tremendous expansion of the PLAN, it is logical that the Pacific
region would focus and dominate Navy thinking in the same way that imperial Japan did during the interwar years. However, with the reactivation of U.S.
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Second Fleet on August 24, 2018, as a subordinate of FFC, it is possible that this
dominance eventually will be challenged.
AN OFFICIALLY UNOFFICIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY16 required DoD to furnish
Congress with three studies of the composition of the future U.S. fleet that would
function as alternatives to the U.S. Navy’s thirty-year shipbuilding plan. As previously noted, the first of these studies was conducted by a Navy team consisting of
subject-matter experts from naval analytical organizations without the concurrence or endorsement of DON leadership. The other two were conducted by a
federally funded research and development center, MITRE Corporation, and an
independent think tank, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analyses (CSBA,
which previously had devoted a considerable amount of its own research to AirSea Battle).
The three reports took significantly different approaches to evaluating a future
fleet. MITRE evaluated requirements against an air-sea approach to defeating
the antiaccess “reconnaissance strike network” of the PRC. The result was a set
of specific recommendations concerning new capabilities and platforms. CSBA
proposed a new concept for naval operations, dividing the fleet between tailored
regional presence forces and a powerful maneuver force that would surge to a
region of conflict. Meanwhile, the Navy team centered its recommendations on
three concepts then under investigation by FFC and Pacific Fleet: distributed
fleet lethality; EMW; and distributed, agile logistics.70 The visibility and viability
of these three concepts have been challenged and their relative prominence has
changed since then because of changes in operational Navy leadership. However,
it is fair to conclude that they still might be, or eventually will be, aspects of a
Navy strategic vision.71
The guiding premise of the Navy Project Team was that the Navy needs a
distributed fleet, which would be created by breaking the current methodology
of battle-force deployments centered on an aircraft carrier strike group (CSG,
formerly known as CVBG for “carrier battle group”) consisting of an aircraft carrier, destroyers as escorts, and associated logistics ships. In contrast, a distributed
architecture “would field a widely dispersed force, operating in dozens of areas,
netted to mass firepower, and supported by robust kill chains and survivable
logistics.”72 The study views the proposed change from CSG-centered operations
to a distributed architecture of dispersed forces as a significant change in the
Navy’s operational strategy (and thereby in its strategic concept or strategic vision). The distributed fleet architecture integrates the three mutually supporting
concepts of distributed fleet lethality; EMW; and distributed, agile logistics.
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Distributed lethality was a concept championed by Vice Admiral Thomas S.
Rowden, USN, former Commander, Naval Surface Forces, and Naval Surface
Force, Pacific.73 In its simplest expression, the concept proposed placing offensive
weapons on platforms that previously had not carried them—particularly the
littoral combat ship (LCS) and, presumably, amphibious warships and combat
logistics force ships. Unfortunately, the details for the latter two types of vessels
were never elucidated prior to Vice Admiral Rowden’s retirement in February
2018, and choosing a missile for the LCSs took an unexpectedly long time. Vice
Admiral Rowden tied distributed lethality to his desire to shift the focus of the
surface navy away from the power-projection (strike against land) mission emphasized by Air-Sea Battle and toward sea control against the PLAN fleet.74 With
the change in surface navy leadership, the status of distributed lethality is now
unclear.
The EMW concept is described by the Navy team study as promoting “improvements in protected, assured datalinks and communications paths . . . to
support a geographically distributed force . . . [including] unmanned vehicles,”
as well as providing “soft-kill” of enemy communications and weapons systems.75
EMW is also an element contained in CS21R and can be considered almost a
traditional operational concept for the modern U.S. Navy, since it was clearly a
major component of war-fighting operations in previous conflicts.
The third concept on which the study was built—distributed, agile logistics—
is described as combining “new technologies, more secure shore-based hubs,
afloat sea-based hubs, afloat sea-bases supporting maneuver forces, and assured
and resilient logistics command and control networks to sustain distributed fleet
operations in a contested environment.”76 Unfortunately, there is no programmatic evidence or public, professional discussions that indicate that distributed,
agile logistics is a developed or developing concept. Improvements in the Navy’s
current logistics capabilities remain marginal, incremental, and secondary to
acquisition of new combat platforms. Since 2017, the distributed, agile logistics
nomenclature has been used only rarely. However, there has been public discussion of improving capabilities for rearming vertical-launch system missiles at
sea, a capability in which the U.S. Navy chose not to invest during the unipolar
moment. There also is a recognition within the Navy that greater planning and
resources need to be directed toward improving logistics capacity in contested
environments.
In responding to Congress, the Navy team report argues that shifting to a distributed fleet requires a much greater number of platforms over the thirty-year
shipbuilding plan that had proposed building up to 314 vessels (identified as 304
manned, ten unmanned). However, the report proposes a vast increase in large,
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unmanned platforms and a comparatively modest increase in manned ships.
Proposed numbers are 321 manned, 136 unmanned, for a total of 457 vessels.77
What elements of the Navy Project Team report would constitute new aspects
of a Navy strategic vision? There are at least two: (1) a move away from a CSGcentered employment/deployment concept toward a distributed fleet, and (2)
adoption of unmanned systems as equivalents to ships. Both would change both
internal and public conceptions of naval operations and force structure. The 355ship goal postdates the submission to Congress of the Navy Project Team report.
THE RHETORIC OF 355 SHIPS
Most critics view the Navy as opportunistic in publicizing a goal of 355 battleforce ships for a future fleet.78 There seemed to be little coincidence in the fact
that presidential candidate Trump suggested the number of 350 ships as an appropriate size for the American fleet during his campaign. (This was first suggested on September 7, 2016, in a campaign speech in Philadelphia. In subsequent
speeches as president, he has adopted the 355 number.)79 At the time, few inside
the Beltway possibly could conceive of a Trump victory and the Navy was content
to urge a fleet size of 308, derived from a Navy Force Structure Assessment (FSA)
conducted in 2014. Once President Trump achieved his unexpected electoral
victory, the Navy issued a new FSA on December 14, 2016, “justifying” the 355
number, with the claim that the assessment had been conducted in a thoroughly
analytical manner. Critical doubts about the thoroughness of the analytics have
prompted the Navy more recently to conduct a new, 2019 FSA (already under
way) that “is expected to better detail the types of ships needed.”80
However, as noted in the Navy Project Team report to Congress (source number five in table 1) and the competing independent reports, the 355 number (depending on how calculated) is actually a lower estimate of the fleet size required
for a full-scale conflict versus the PRC or Russia, let alone a fleet to handle some
mix of dispersed 2+2 contingencies. The Navy Project Team called for a total of
457 ships, although 136 of those would be large, unmanned vessels. The competing reports from CSBA and MITRE called for 382 (arguably 340, by current
ship-counting rules) and 414 ships, respectively.
It is difficult to find a single independent naval analyst who will argue that
fewer than 355 ships would be sufficient to ensure victory in a naval campaign
against the antiaccess network of the PRC. Instead, many will argue that the current defense budget cannot support the acquisition and subsequent operations
and maintenance costs of a 355-ship fleet—making that estimate moot.81 However, that is a different assessment from whether the current fleet would prevail
in war or even match peacetime COCOM requirements.
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What, then, does the 355 number really mean? It simply means that the U.S.
Navy recognizes that in a world of 2+2 threats (as opposed to the assumption of
global cooperation that laces CS21R), neither the current number of approximately 285 total ships, nor the thirty-year shipbuilding plan total of 304 ships,
nor the previous 2014 FSA total of 308 would be enough when the potential opponent (the PRC) simply is building ships—with designed capabilities similar to
U.S. warships—at a much faster rate. Unlike under previous administrations, the
Navy leadership now is willing to say so. In previous administrations, the rhetoric
was that, even if fewer in numbers, U.S. warships were more capable. Yet again,
rigorous and detailed unclassified/open-source analyses of that claim have not
been conducted in recent years. And they particularly have not been done in the
context of planned PLA capabilities (such as indigenous aircraft carrier construction). From the perspective of an aspirational goal, and given the lack of detailed
analyses, 355 ships is as good a number as any other that is greater than today’s.82
The wrinkle, however, is that the acquisition of a 355-ship Navy now has
become law! The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act includes a provision
requiring a buildup to 355 ships “as soon as practicable.”83 Of course, the weakness of the statement (“as soon as practicable” could be 2050) and the inability
to enforce such a provision—even if it were to be placed into a subsequent appropriations act—is well evident to the rest of Congress. As noted, changes in
House of Representatives leadership following the 2018 midterm elections augur
fiscal restraints.
HOW WE (MIGHT) FIGHT
Of all the inputs to the algorithm, How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval War
fighter is the least authoritative but originally was intended to be the most publicly accessible.84 It remained on CNO Greenert’s “to do” list from his first day in
office but with a low priority, so attending to other events frequently superseded
work on it, and it was released only several months before his retirement from
office in September 2015. It was placed on the Navy’s professional reading list
immediately, but—since it never was endorsed by his successor, Admiral Richardson, and never was publicized—its impact on public debate can be described,
charitably, as minimal.
CNO Greenert envisioned a public monograph that would explain the missions, attributes, capabilities, current operational concepts, and combat history
(in brief) of the U.S. Navy to new officers and petty officers and the American
public at large.85 It was meant to highlight the uniqueness of the Navy (with all
the consequences for public and congressional support that implies). With a final
product at 166 pages, it obviously is a more extensive exposition than a standard
official document. It is not a service strategic vision, per se, but describes its
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purpose thus: “to articulate in a single volume the elements that determine the
way we [the Navy] operate, as well as some of the overall concepts that guide
our methods.” The book proceeds in a logical sequence, describing the shaping
factors of “the maritime environment, our Service attributes, our history, and
our current and projected future missions,” in that order.86 This is more akin to
Samuel Huntington’s strategic concept approach to articulating the Navy’s purpose than the more recent strategic vision approach.
The value of How We Fight as an evocation of the Navy’s strategic vision is
that it gathers many of the justifying arguments used by the strategic-level documents into one source. Many of the justifying arguments are captured succinctly
in tables and, more importantly, are presented in context rather than the isolated
factoid manner in which they appear in other documents. As an example, the
“political characteristics of the maritime environment” (which, incidentally, are
not mentioned at all in the Summary NDS) are listed as the following:
• Customary Law of the Sea (LOS) provides rights of ships, delineates high seas
from territorial seas
• Warships are the sovereign territory of their nation wherever they operate in
accordance with LOS
• Freedom of navigation must be demonstrated against unlawful claims
• Sea provides a base for power projection, forward presence and crisis
response
• Littorals are population, economic and political centers
• Operating forward, navies have considerable political influence and deterrent
effects and can provide humanitarian assistance87

Similar concise depictions and tables are provided for physical characteristics,
economic characteristics, strategic and tactical attributes, basic types of naval
warfare, future trends with operational effects, and others—all often incorporated into Navy strategic documents but rarely roped into one corral in mutual
support. The ties to the other sources also include expanded discussions of alldomain access and EMW, both introduced in CS21R and, in the case of EMW,
remaining in subsequent documents. Access and EMW are placed in the context
of more-traditional naval warfare areas such as air warfare and missile defense,
expeditionary warfare, strike warfare, surface warfare, and undersea warfare.
Resilience is discussed as an attribute required of sailors as well as ships, which
resonates with CNO Richardson, even if he prefers the word toughness.
In bringing the seven sources into a Navy future vision, How We Fight could
be put in the “background information and detailed explanation” category,
supporting the more authoritative documents. However, given its content and
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structure, perhaps the work would be better subtitled “Handbook for Drafting
Navy Strategic Visions.”88
GLEANING FROM OTHER SOURCES
Other sources from which may be gleaned additional clues about the Navy’s
strategic vision include the DON Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Financial Report, a
report that appears to have taken the place of what once was the Annual Report
of the Secretary of the Navy to Congress.89 The title and format of the report have
changed throughout different presidential administrations, but it still is meant to
be a DON report created independently of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
To deconflict potential parochial statements by the Secretary of the Navy from
more-authoritative statements by the Secretary of Defense, the report’s scope has
been narrowed to focus on the DON budget. However, it still gives the Secretary
of the Navy some room to discuss priorities and objectives that could shape a
new naval narrative.
Other sources are the congressional testimonies of the Navy leadership as well
as speeches and articles, primarily by the Secretary of the Navy and CNO, to a
wide variety of audiences. As in political stump speeches, frequently repeated
themes indicate elements of the Navy strategic vision. Such speeches and articles
might be expected to coincide with the NDS, CS21R, and the other five sources
we have examined. However, they often are tailored to audiences in a way that
can identify emerging concepts not elucidated previously. Other naval leaders
also may expound on emerging concepts.
Many of the speeches can be obtained from official Navy websites (such as
www.navy.mil). However, much more can be gleaned from the independent
professional publication U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, which routinely publishes articles by senior naval leaders alongside critiques, alternative ideas, and
criticisms by other serving naval personnel and civilians in a continuing debate
on the future of national security. Few ideas make it into naval documents that
have not been discussed—perhaps debated fiercely—in Proceedings previously.
Authoritative information also can be obtained from reports on the Navy
prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Even OPNAV staffers rely on CRS and CBO
reports as quick sources for data.
AND THEN THERE IS THE POM
The longest-running debate concerning DoD is whether it is strategy or budget
that drives its programs and force structure.90 In theory, national strategy should
be the driving factor. The military is a tool the nation uses to achieve its security
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objectives in a dangerous world. Of course, the economic reality is that wants are
generally unlimited, while resources are limited. In battle, the commander wants
every possible resource available to defeat the enemy while preserving the lives
of his or her own troops. History indicates that overwhelming force applied decisively ends most wars quickly. Yet no one can determine fully how much money
to spend on security since—at least for democratic states—wars can be predicted
only in the abstract, not their precise occurrence in time and space.
In peacetime, a democratic state may use a security strategy to determine
the details of its military, but funding these details becomes a political process
requiring compromise among competing domestic requirements. This is a weakness that democratic states do not necessarily share with authoritarian states
having command (or mostly command) economies. The situation provokes
critics to argue that public strategy documents are poor guides for determining
a democratic state’s defense strategy.91 Better, they argue, to “follow the money”
in the president’s budget submission and congressional legislation. Others have
argued that a realistic strategic vision should be designed primarily on the basis
of resources available, rather than the service’s (or defense agency’s) self-concept
or aspirations.
For the Navy, CNO Richardson attempted to end the debate by directing in
October 2016 that the Navy’s POM process be initiated by the Deputy CNO
(DCNO) for Operations, Plans and Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5) and consist of
three phases.92 First is the strategy phase, led by OPNAV N3/N5, with other
OPNAV staff codes participating, followed by a requirements program-integration
phase, led by the DCNO for Warfare Systems (OPNAV N9), and a resourceintegration phase, led by the DCNO for Integration of Capabilities and Resources
(OPNAV N8). At the CNO’s direction, “under this new process, POM-19 and
subsequent POMs [began] three months earlier than historical POMs . . . [with]
the end product of the POM development process [being] a strategy-based, fiscally balanced, and defendable Navy Program for submission to OSD [Office of
the Secretary of Defense], which appropriately implements OSD fiscal and programming guidance, addresses [Secretary of the Navy] and CNO priorities, and
achieves the best balance of strategic guidance as provided in the CNOG.”93 To
achieve this result, the CNO also directed an OPNAV staff realignment.
The significance of the CNO’s directive is that it again reinforces the theoretical role of strategy as the determinant of program requirements and force structure. In turn, this also should reestablish the importance of a Navy strategic vision
in guiding future Navy decision-making. Of course, thorough implementation of
the renewed process under the congressional mandate of a 25 percent headquarters staff reduction throughout DoD may prove challenging.
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A MURKY MIX
If we metaphorically sum up the algorithm, what can we determine concerning
the U.S. Navy’s collective vision of its appropriate future?
Although the Navy always has had a reputation for independent views that
make the staunchest joint ideologues livid, it is clear that CNO Richardson and
the Navy leadership are committed to a vision that conforms to the 2018 NDS and
its joint requirements. The problem they face is that the NDS (at least in its Summary) betrays a land-centric approach to understanding warfare that is hard to
translate into a naval strategy. It is not only that the terminology does not fit naval
campaigns; it is that, although there can be a tactically defensive naval posture,
there is no such thing as a strategic defensive posture in naval warfare except not
to fight at sea. Unlike in a land campaign, there are no physical spaces to defend,
only forces. Thus, wartime forces at sea exist only to attack; there are no contact
or blunt phases in naval warfare.
This problem is magnified by the fact that the great-power competition, which
serves as the premise of the NDS, is not inherently a land-centric competition. If
conflict were to break out today or in the immediate future with the potentially
toughest opponent, the PLA, the fighting would not take place on the land. It
primarily would be (for the United States) a counter-antiaccess campaign in the
maritime, air, space, and electronic spectrum / cyber dimensions.94 No planner
has suggested that it is in the interest of the United States and its allies to fight a
land war in East Asia. Victory in a counter-antiaccess campaign would require
strikes on military targets in mainland China (C4ISR nodes, missile TELs, airfields, command structures, etc.). However, most of these strikes would not come
from ground forces. Such a campaign simply does not fit a land-centric approach.
In the case of Russia, there could be ground combat, but—given the methods
the Putin regime has demonstrated—it likely would be small-unit combat in a
hybrid/gray-zone scenario. However, the likely locations of such scenarios—the
High North, the Baltic region, the Black Sea—largely would require a naval and
air response by U.S. forces, at least in the initial phases.
The other two potential opponents, Iran and North Korea, have unique characteristics but would not present the regional-to-global character of great-power
war. However, in both cases, the majority of U.S. forces would be located outside
the contested territory and would require an initial maritime response to reenter.
Thus, it is very difficult to craft a naval strategic vision to satisfy the challenges
of the great-power competition world while remaining within the confines of
the public Summary NDS. A great-power-competition strategy for naval forces
would be more similar to the Cold War Maritime Strategy than any recent conception. However, a Maritime Strategy approach to describing the Navy’s vision
rams into joint ideology.
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The NDS does discuss the need for allies and coalitions. CS21R is premised
completely on such cooperation. However, the Trump administration does not
appear willing to make the sacrifices necessary to maintain the tight alliance
structure on which America’s Cold War posture was predicated and that is the
overarching assumption of CS21R. If preserving the alliance structure is no longer a priority, much of the front section of CS21R cannot be a rallying point for
the Navy’s public image.
There is nothing in the 2016 Design 1.0 that contradicts the 2018 Summary
NDS. However, much of Design 1.0 is concerned with Navy organization, leadership, and training—all subjects that are of great importance to the CNO and that
have an impact on operations, but that are not involved primarily in defining the
service’s force structure or employment. The sections that discuss force structure
assessments have stimulated debate and resulted in considerable internal discussion concerning gaps in naval capabilities and employment of unmanned and
potentially autonomous platforms, but it was not the CNO’s intent to define an
answer to such questions. Design 1.0 does emphasize the complexity of contested
environments, particularly the need for the Navy to examine how it would operate in severe electromagnetic warfare conditions that would interfere with its
objective to conduct dispersed but networked operations. This is a problem that
OPNAV and the fleet commands previously had a tendency to ignore, although
the Naval Postgraduate School has been examining the need for “network optional” operations for some time.95
CNO Richardson’s The Future Navy also is in sync with the NDS and willing
to name names concerning the threats from the PRC, Russia, North Korea, and
Iran. The paper’s emphasis is new technology development, and in its own way
it casts doubt on the 355-ship number as a defining metric by maintaining that a
“355-ship Navy using current technology is insufficient for maintaining maritime
superiority.”96 Rapid introduction of technology is the CNO’s measure of success.
There is a significant contradiction within the CNO’s white paper series, however. This contradiction begins to show itself in Design 2.0, in the remarks on
sustainability and the call to avoid being overwhelmed by the blistering pace. It
is the CNO who is directing—throughout the three papers—the sense of urgency
in response to the security environment. One could surmise that, in adding the
caution in his second version of the Design, he is reacting to analyses of the recent
Seventh Fleet ship collisions that blamed them, in part, on a sense of operational
urgency that required the crews to skip necessary training and certification.
Indeed, Design 2.0 does direct the “execution of the Comprehensive Review and
Strategic Readiness Review program” resulting from the accident investigations.97
Yet the sense of great urgency remains at the forefront, and there are no details on
how to achieve a balance between that and sustainability.
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Moreover, there seems to be no final, identifiable goal. In saying that “[w]e
must think in terms of infinite, instead of finite, time frames,” the CNO is giving
the Navy an endless quest.98 How can one maintain morale and conviction in the
face of a perilous and absolutely infinite voyage? Even in the high-tempo/highpressure competition of the Cold War, American leaders held to the expectation
that someday the internal contradictions in Communism would bring about its
own collapse. There was, therefore, light at the far end of the tunnel, a victory
(through deterrence) for which to strive. Not only does Design 2.0 not define an
end state, but it seems to imply that—except through a major war—there is no
possible end to the urgent, relax-not-a-minute military competition. It is hard to
establish a pace or balance if there is nothing but an endless loop ahead. And it is
hard to construct a persuasive public Navy strategic vision if endless competition
is the only goal—a reason why the Design series, in itself, cannot fill the role of
Navy vision.
The air-sea battle concept certainly would support the objectives of the NDS,
but it only defines one particular Navy mission, in one particular theater. On
the other hand, it does define a victory. Unfortunately, Air-Sea Battle effectively
has been declared “not joint enough.” The whole premise of its joint successor,
JAM-GC—that the struggle is over access to the global commons—is, in contrast,
anemic.
The various force-structure assessments and the 355-ship number together do
not constitute a strategic vision. Meanwhile, How We Fight is obviously too long
for executive reading and does not have the narrative arc that makes modern
nonfiction popular.
Therefore, the overall conclusions are as follows:
1.	 The Navy leadership recognizes that CS21R does not fit the Trump
administration’s needs for a Navy strategic vision. Some sections could
be recycled, but the overall package has been overtaken by events.
2.	 The current Navy leadership does want to have a Navy vision that fully
supports the NDS focus on great-power competition, but the NDS (at
least in its Summary) is not written in a way that the Navy can parrot.
The tenor of the NDS seems to be that because strategy should be
joint, there is no distinction in the strategic approaches to land and
naval combat. (We will put traditional airpower doctrine aside for this
discussion.)
3.	 At present, the Navy leadership still is following Secretary of Defense
Mattis’s concerns about the negative effects of extensive public
discussion.99 A publicly articulated strategic vision is not a current
priority.
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4.	 Design 1.0 and its subsequent statements do give the Navy internal
directions and tasks that conform to the NDS; however, they are
not written in a way that would provide for a public strategic vision
that captures the Navy’s current and future missions (and resulting
structure). Both Design 1.0 and 2.0 contain one-paragraph summaries of
the Navy mission, but they are too brief to present a full image. Perhaps
the most important inclusion from the CNO’s Design in a public vision
would be his sense of urgency in experimentation and technology
adoption.
5.	 Nevertheless, a public, unclassified, strategic vision could enhance
public and congressional support for the U.S. Navy. The correlation
between a compelling public vision and enhanced support has been
demonstrated historically.
6.	 On the other hand, the internal programs and operations of the U.S.
Navy do not need a publicly articulated and elegantly crafted vision to
conform to the direction of the NDS. Highlighted by the pivot to the
Pacific, the Navy largely had conformed to Secretary of Defense Mattis’s
NDS even before the 2018 NDS existed.
7.	 A Navy strategic vision that focuses on great-power competition as it
exists and that conforms to the objective, although not the strategic,
philosophy of the NDS would look more like Air-Sea Battle (with an
appropriate addition of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities) than any other
strategic concept currently extant. However, joint ideology and U.S.
ground forces have defeated Air-Sea Battle. The air-sea battle concept
had the misfortune of coming into prominence when the presidential
administration did not want the word China spoken except in the
context of that country inevitably being a “responsible stakeholder.” This
prohibition does not apply, necessarily, to the current administration.
8.	 The 355 number is a program and budgetary marker that, in itself, has
no dependence on—nor does it provide a basis for—a Navy strategic
vision.
9.	 The panoply of Navy and independent force-structure assessments are
useful for exposing appropriate debates—such as how much of the fleet
should be unmanned, and why. The most-detailed analyses have been
done appropriately on the basis of an Air-Sea Battle approach, even if it
is not mentioned. Yet it is difficult to explain why the fleet should have
355 ships instead of 354 or 353 or 350. The consensus is that the current
number of approximately 285 is too low for war fighting and, possibly,
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for great-power deterrence. What the actual number should be has not
been assessed thus far to conclusive and persuasive rigor. What the new
Congress will fund may be another number entirely.
10.	 To provide the number of platforms necessary in a conflict against a
great power, the Navy intends to pursue aggressively the development
of unmanned surface and undersea vessels (as well as aircraft), some of
which will be self-deploying and comparable in size to manned vessels.
This could help operationalize the distributed fleet and distributed
lethality concepts. The assumption, however, is that unmanned vessels
can be acquired and operated more cheaply than manned platforms.
11.	 A summarized How We Fight could provide the keel for an updated
public Navy strategic vision, with appropriate NDS themes and Design
1.0 and 2.0 concerns added. In its current state, however, How We Fight
is an unread textbook.
What should a Navy strategic vision appropriate to the objectives of the NDS,
the CNO’s directions, and Trump administration objectives overall say? Summing the algorithm and adding other clues, a concise recommended summary
follows.
In the peacetime, military-technological competition with great powers, the
U.S. Navy will experiment continually with new technologies and concepts so
as to remain ahead of competitors and profit from the ideas of competitors,
when appropriate. New technologies and concepts will be introduced to the fleet
when matured and engineered for sea. These will include substantial numbers of
unmanned, partly manned, and optionally manned vessels and aircraft, which—
combined with EMW capabilities—could enable a more widely distributed
fleet. These experiments and developments—necessary for achieving victory in
future conflicts—will take priority over the peacetime deployment and forwardpresence requirements of the COCOMs. Additionally, a dynamic forceemployment model will modify the previous predictability and length of forward
deployments, allowing for greater experimentation.
The U.S. Navy will be sized and structured to support and win a conventionalweapons joint campaign that likely will be primarily maritime (which includes
air over sea, space, and electromagnetic/cyber warfare) in character against the
PRC, as led by the CCP, or Russia, as led by President Putin. Being able to win
such a conflict will provide the most effective deterrence against its occurrence.
It is assumed that all other missions can be accomplished successfully by tailoring
this force structure in scope to other assigned tasks.
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With these capabilities, the U.S. Navy will carry out its enduring function
as the guarantor of access to the global commons and to overseas markets and
materials on which America’s economic prosperity depends. Access to the global
commons also ensures the ability of the joint force to transit foreign areas of
crises and conflict when called on. The U.S. Navy also will provide for defense of
the U.S. homeland by maintaining the most survivable leg of the strategic nuclear
triad, and the Navy can function as the forward edge of U.S. missile defense when
necessary.
A perusal of U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings would indicate that the Navy has
the narrative and speechwriting talent to write an updated public strategic vision
quite well.
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NOTES

1.	The term strategic vision is used instead of
strategy (as in the Maritime Strategy) because
of the controversy over which Department
of Defense component “does strategy.” Under
joint ideology, the services man, train, and
equip the forces, but do not create strategy,
which is the exclusive purview of the combatant commanders. While this may seem to be
merely an argument over terminology, and
despite the fact that the services and defense
analysts routinely refer to service plans as
“strategy,” use of the term strategic vision sidesteps that whole debate. Many of the plans
are indeed visions that do not survive contact
with the reality of the budget.
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2.	The term strategy concept is from Samuel
P. Huntington, “National Policy and the
Transoceanic Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 80/5/615 (May 1954), pp. 483–93.
From the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s, the
U.S. Navy was enamored of using strategic
concept to describe its definition of purpose,
but it largely has been dropped in the last two
decades. (For example, after the Cold War,
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’
Strategic Concepts Branch was renamed
the Strategy and Concepts Branch.) This
is another reason this article uses the term
strategic vision.
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3.	A bureaucratic reason that CS21R remains in
the public vision is that it is a DON document signed by the Secretary of the Navy as
well as the heads of the three sea (not only
naval) services: the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine
Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard (the latter is
not actually part of the DON). To negotiate
a document approved and signed by all four
individuals (thus representing all their equities) is a prodigious and lengthy effort.
4.	Like all endeavors done well by military officers and defense civil servants, the drafting of
naval strategic visions takes time and energy
that spill over between administrations, and
the process does not necessarily follow the
drafting of higher-level guidance (such as the
National Security Strategy) in tight, sequential
order. In the case of CS21R, drafting of the
document—which involved Navy and Marine
Corps staff officers, scholars at the Naval
War College and Naval Postgraduate School,
and other members of the naval analytical
enterprise—began in the waning months
of the George W. Bush administration,
even though it eventually was issued under
President Obama. For an assessment of the
drafting of CS21R, see Peter Swartz, William
Rosenau, and Hannah Kates, The Origins and
Development of A Cooperative Strategy for
21st Century Seapower (2015) (Arlington,
VA: CNA, September 2017), available at www
.cna.org/.
5.	An underlying theme found in Simon Reich
and Peter Dombrowski, The End of Grand
Strategy: US Maritime Operations in the
Twenty-First Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Univ. Press, 2017). The book, however, does
not necessarily endorse the Trump administration’s foreign policy perspective.
6.	There is an existing official USN web page
that holds links to so-called strategic documents ranging from the Summary NDS and
2018 Nuclear Posture Review to the U.S. Coast
Guard Arctic Strategy and DON Innovation
Vision. See “Strategic Documents,” Navy.mil.
However, this is a nonhierarchical mixture,
and there is no attempt to explain how they
relate to each other or whether they are directive or aspirational. The site also includes
links to Secretary of the Navy and CNO
speeches and transcripts.
7.	The full name of the thirty-year plan is
the Report to Congress on the Annual
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Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval
Vessels. Officially overlaid on all these is joint
doctrine—but a good portion of joint doctrine is so banal or boilerplate that the services often can ignore it with some impunity.
8.	The POM is the formal document each
DoD entity prepares for submission to the
Secretary of Defense outlining its spending
on new systems acquisition, operations and
maintenance, personnel, and other costs.
All programs of record must be included in
the POM to ensure sustained funding. The
internal DoD approval process, now referred
to as PPBE (planning, programming, budgeting, and execution), is complex, with multiple
(and sometimes redundant) phases. Not all
POM submissions necessarily make it into
the defense budget the Secretary of Defense
presents to the president, or that the president
transmits to Congress, or that Congress
approves.
9.	On the most recent title changes, see Swartz,
Rosenau, and Kates, Origins and Development, p. 88.
10. Stuart B. Munsch [RAdm., USN], unclassified
phone conversation with author, October 2,
2018.
11. Jeff Schogol, “Rep. Adam Smith: Trump’s
Military Spending and Planning Needs a
Reality Check,” Task & Purpose, February
19, 2018, taskandpurpose.com/; Katie Bo
Williams, “What the Midterms Mean for
National Security,” Defense One, November 7,
2018, www.defenseone.com/.
12. Carlisle A. H. Trost [Adm., USN, CNO],
“Looking beyond the Maritime Strategy,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 113/1/1,007 (January 1987), p. 15.
13. Swartz, Rosenau, and Kates suggest that the
OPNAV programming organizations (codes)
do not always see the need for a formal strategic vision document, since they “have tended
to believe that they have more than enough
other guidance to get their jobs done without
an additional product . . . to accommodate in
the POM process” (p. 102). My own view is
that the absence of a formal document allows
the programmers and budgeteers to cherrypick preferred guidance statements from the
CNO and Secretary of the Navy documents
and speeches. On this point, a good discussion can be found in Irv Blickstein et al., Navy
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Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution: A Reference Guide for Senior Leaders,
Managers, and Action Officers (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2016), p. 10.
14. Joe Gould, “Wittman to US Navy: ‘You Have
to Say 355 Is the Number,’” Defense News,
April 11, 2018, www.defensenews.com/.
15. Jason Schwartz, “‘We Are Fighting for Information about War’: Pentagon Curbs Media
Access,” Politico, July 26, 2018, www.politico
.com/.
16. The reference to the CCP is deliberate, because the People’s Liberation Army is pledged
to the party, not to the state of China.
17. Kevin Baron, “Pentagon Began Clampdown
on Senior Leader’s Public Speaking Months
Ago,” Defense One, November 14, 2018, www
.defenseone.com/.
18. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “I
am certain that, at some time in the future,
President Xi and I, together with President
Putin of Russia, will start talking about a
meaningful halt to what has become a
major and uncontrollable Arms Race. The
U.S. spent 716 Billion Dollars this year.
Crazy!,” Twitter, December 3, 2018,
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1069584730880974849.
19. An excellent example of a discussion by an
influential academic is John J. Mearsheimer,
“A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy
and Deterrence in Europe,” International
Security 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 3–57, available at mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/. There was
also concern that implementing the Maritime
Strategy might spark a nuclear exchange. See
Barry R. Posen, “Inadvertent Nuclear War?
Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank,”
International Security 7, no. 2 (Fall 1982), pp.
28–54, available at www.jstor.org/. A detailed
assessment that is supportive of the Maritime
Strategy is found in Norman Friedman, The
U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1988). The best source
for the briefings and documents that built
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